I. INTRODUCTION
In 1948, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn proposed that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution be interpreted as absolutely protecting speech that contributed to self-government,' or public speech. For Meiklejohn, the purpose of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the press was to ensure that all speech relevant to democratic debate be heard, thereby enabling citizens to engage in effective self-government. 2 Thus, Meiklejohn argued that the Amendment protected only speech that contributed to self-government.'
In the mid-1960s the U.S. Supreme Court began applying a decidedly Meiklejohnian approach to certain First Amendment claims, using a selfgovernment rationale to justify enhanced protection for freedom of expression on matters of public concern or public interest. The process began with the Court's 1964 New York Times v. Sullivan decision, in which the Court estab-lished the actual malice fault requirement for public officials suing for libel, recognizing "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .
'..., 4 Three years later, the Court extended the actual malice requirement to "false light" invasion of privacy lawsuits based on "false reports of matters of public interest,"' and the following year the justices ruled that public employees may not be penalized for speaking out on "issues of public importance." 6 More recently, in Snyder v. Phelps, a highly publicized case involving protests at military funerals by the Westboro Baptist Church, the Court wrote that the distinction between public and private speech was critical to the outcome of the case.
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As the Supreme Court used Alexander Meiklejohn's public speech rationale to support expansion of First Amendment free speech rights in the 1960s and 1970s, it refrained from ever acknowledging the remainder of Meiklejohn's argument-that private speech is outside the purview of the First Amendment Not until the mid-1 980s did the Court directly confront the question of whether speech on non-public issues warranted First Amendment protection, but its pronouncements on the issue were less than clear: "In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern .... While such speech is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment, its protections are less stringent." 9 Despite the Court's cautious language, some lower courts have chosen to drop the "not" from the quote above, interpreting speech about private people and matters of private concern to be totally without First Amendment protection."° One of the best known of these cases occurred in 2009 when the U.S.
While the "deconstitutionalization" of private speech has been most apparent in defamation cases, the trickledown effect of adopting a Meiklejohnian approach is certainly not limited to defamation. 9 The Supreme Court never explicitly stated that private speech is unprotected by the First Amendment, but it has emphasized the constitutional importance of public speech in cases involving speech by government employees,° intentional infliction of emotional distress, 2 and false light invasion of privacy, 22 as well as others. 23 While this article focuses on defamation law, the implications of the Court's embrace of a Meiklejohnian approach reaches across numerous categories of communications law. In effect, lower courts are removing a wide range of speech from constitutional protections at the very time that new communication technologies such as email, Facebook, Twitter, and blogs are giving private individuals the power to reach wider and wider audiences. Thus, although it may be true that through the Internet "any person.., can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox," 24 if a court decides the town crier's speech does not involve a matter of public concern it might have no constitutional protection.
The purpose of this article is to identify the extent to which lower federal courts and state courts have, in effect, deconstitutionalized private defamatory speech. Part II provides an overview of the development of constitutional proovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), was inapplicable in a private-private libel action and that state law was determinative); Weissman v. Sri Lanka Curry House, 469 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ("Because the Supreme Court has not extended constitutional protections for public speech to speech of purely private concern,.., private plaintiff/private issue defamation actions must be analyzed under state common law principles.").
19 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (employment civil rights claim); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) ; see e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (unlawful wiretaps); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (state right of privacy); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (intentional infliction of emotional distress). "Deconstitutionalization" is a term of art that has been used by legal scholars to describe the refusal to enforce constitutional protections in school settings, the public sector work space, and other areas of law. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstituionalization of Education, 36 Loy. U. CHM.. L.J. 111 (2004) . 20 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (recognizing the "practical realities" in regards to the actions of employees in government offices); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573 (denying recovery for defamatory statements unless made with knowledge of falsity).
21 See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 ("The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment ... can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress.").
22 See, e.g., Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88 (First Amendment protections require a showing that defendant acted with knowledge of report's falsehood or acted with reckless disregard of the truth).
23 See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 (illegally recorded conversation regarding matter of public concern released by media protected by First Amendment).
24 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) .
[Vol. 21 tection for defamatory speech and the subsequent erosion of protection for private libel. Part III briefly reviews literature related to the public speech/private speech dichotomy. Part IV surveys and analyzes cases in which courts expressly adopted the view that the First Amendment does not protect private speech, as well as cases in which courts took the lesser, more tentative step of merely questioning whether constitutional protections apply to private speech. Each section of the case analysis focuses on a separate element of defamation law affected by constitutional considerations. Section A addresses the falsity/truth element, Section B fault, Section C the First Amendment opinion defense, and Section D the question of whether constitutional protections apply to nonmedia defamation defendants. Part IV discusses why the Meiklejohnian approach is disconcerting, and argues the Supreme Court should stop confusing lower courts with dangerous dicta, 25 which is leading to the deconstitutionalization of private speech.
II. LIBEL LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE LAW OF LIBEL
As noted above, the Supreme Court began the process of applying constitutional protections to the law of libel in the 1964 decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, holding that the First Amendment requires a public official claiming libel to prove with convincing clarity that the defamatory statement was published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 26 The Court labeled this fault standard "actual malice." ' 27 A few months later, the Court again applied the actual malice fault requirement, extending it to criminal libel actions brought as the result of criticism of public officials. As it had in New York Times, the Court relied on the Meiklejohnian theory without directly citing or quoting Alexander Meiklejohn: "For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." 29 During the following decade, the Court grappled with just how far the actual malice requirement should reach. In 1967, the Court decided that in false light invasion of privacy actions arising from "reports of matters of public interest,"
25
As noted below and as discussed by other scholars, much of the Court's discussion of political speech theories has occurred in dicta. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. REv. 515, 528 (2011) ("The Court's comments, usually in dicta, that refer to political speech being the at the core of the First Amendment can be counterpoised to possibly the most widely invoked black letter rule-the presumptive unconstitutionality of content discrimination.").
26 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) . 27 Id. at 284-85. Walker, a four-member plurality of the Court held that public figures would need to show "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers" to win libel actions." In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren called for application of the same fault standard-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth-to both public figures and public officials. He reasoned that both categories of individuals "often play an influential role in ordering society" and have "ready access" to the mass media "both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities." 32 Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren argued that citizens have "a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct" of public figures, and "freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials."' Only two other justices concurred in Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom opinion, 37 and just three years later the Court shifted its position by finding that a plaintiffs status should determine the fault standard to be applied in defamations cases. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court ruled that, while public officials and public figures must prove actual malice to prevail in libel suits, private individuals must prove negligence, though states were free to establish a higher standard of fault for private persons if they chose. 38 
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Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 33 Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). 34 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). tual damages. 39 All plaintiffs, public and private, would have to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages. 4 " Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, observed that "the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact,"' and referred to punitive damages as "private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." 42 It's important to emphasize that the Gertz majority never stated that its decision was contingent upon the subject of the allegedly defamatory statement being a matter of public concern. Indeed the majority opinion rejected the idea that constitutional protection should hinge on subject matter. Justice Powell wrote that such an approach "would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not .... We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience ofjudges." ' 4 3 While clarifying the rules as to which level of fault plaintiffs would have to prove to win their libel cases, the majority opinion in Gertz also introduced uncertainty as to whether the defendant's status impacted which level of fault was required. At the outset, Justice Powell defined the issue in Gertz as "whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements."4 Throughout the opinion, Justice Powell repeatedly referred to the need to protect "publishers," "broadcasters" and "the media" from juries" --words that led some courts to conclude that constitutional limits did not apply in cases involving nonmedia defendants. 45 See id. at 340 ("Our decisions recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Allowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberties.") (emphasis added); id. at 341 ("The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation.") (emphasis added); id. at 350 (1974) ("Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship.") (emphasis added). 46 Builders $50,000 in compensatory or presumed damages and $300,000 in punitive damages in a case that resulted from an erroneous credit report sent to five of the defendant's subscribers stating the construction company had filed for bankruptcy. 4 " Dun & Bradstreet moved for a new trial on the ground that the trial judge's instructions had allowed the jury to award presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice. 49 Although the trial court indicated doubt that Gertz applied to nonmedia defendants, it granted a new trial." The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that Gertz's First Amendment requirements applied only to media defendants. 5 "Recognizing disagreement among the lower courts about when the protections of Gertz apply," the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 52 Acknowlwith respect to proof of damages, we are not persuaded that this differentiation is unwarranted."); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362-63 (Ore. 1977) ("In the instant case there is no public official or figure as plaintiff, there is no issue of public concern, and there is no media defendant. The crucial elements in the above cases which brought the United States Supreme Court into the field of defamation law are missing.") (footnote omitted); Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 461 A.2d 414, 417-18 (Vt. 1983) ("There is a clear distinction between a publication which disseminates news for public consumption and one which provides specialized information to a selective, finite audience. We therefore reject, as have the majority of circuit courts, the assertion that credit agencies such as defendant are the type of media worthy of First Amendment protection as contemplated by New York Times and its progeny."), aff ' In the plurality opinion, Justice Powell characterized Gertz as an effort to balance the states' interest in allowing individuals to be compensated for injury to their reputations with the First Amendment's interest in protecting speech on matters of public concern, emphasizing that "[n]othing in our [Gertz] opinion, however, indicated that this same balance would be struck regardless of the type of speech involved." 56 Although Justice Powell worked hard to convince readers that Dun & Bradstreet was faithful to-and the natural extension ofGertz, some of his brethren on the Court were not convinced. In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron White reflected on Justice Powell's decision not to follow Gertz: "I had thought that the decision in Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false statements of fact injurious to reputation, whether the statement is made privately or publicly and whether or not it implicates a matter of public importance."" In a dissent joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, Justice Brennan pointed out:
One searches Gertz in vain for a single word to support the proposition that limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only when speech involved matters of public concern. Gertz could not have been grounded in such a premise. Distrust of placing in the courts the power to decide what speech was of public concern was precisely the rationale Gertz offered for rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality approach." Justice Powell was careful in his plurality opinion to characterize private speech as having "reduced constitutional value," Likewise, Justice White saw the plurality opinion as going beyond the fault level required for punitive and presumed damages: "[I]t must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as this." 62 Justice White himself would have gone even farther, expressly calling for a return to common law rules whenever a libel plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure.
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The following year, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, a fivemember majority of the Court ruled that the subject matter of a defamatory report (i.e., "speech of public concern") would govern when the plaintiff had to prove falsity, giving judges an uncomfortably critical role in the determination of what is and what is not a matter of public concern.' Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said New York Times and its progeny reflected "two forces" that had reshaped the common law: The plaintiffs status, namely whether they are a public or private figure and "whether the speech at issue is of public concern." 65 Once again, though, the Court stopped short of declaring private defamatory speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, stating:
When the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of public concern. When the speech is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the common-law landscape.'
Justice O'Connor cited only "two forces" determining constitutional requirements in libel cases, her opinion served to further fuel confusion over whether the defendant's status was a third force to be considered. 67 In discussing issues the Court was not required to address, Justice O'Connor explicitly avoided the issue, stating, "Nor need we consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia defendant."
Finally in 1990, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., a seven-member majority hinged the constitutional protection of opinions on the subject matter of the article: "[A] statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection." 6 9 The Milkovich Court kept alive the possibility of a medianonmedia distinction, however, by declaring that provable falsity was required "at least in situations, like the present, where a media defendant is involved." 7°T hat statement was followed by a footnote stating, "In Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases involving nonmedia defendants, and accordingly we do the same." 7 '
While these cases all stand for the proposition that speech on matters of public concern should receive more protection than private speech, it is important to emphasize that a majority of the Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment is totally inapplicable in private-person-private-issue libel suits. Instead, the Court has used cautious, and sometimes convoluted, language: "reduced constitutional value,"
72 "of less First Amendment concern," 73 "not totally unprotected by the First Amendment," and "not necessarily forc [ing] any change in at least some of the features of the common-law landscape." 75 The Court has not declared that the identity or status of the defendant-media or nonmedia-govems the applicability of constitutional protections. In Dun & Bradstreet the Court had the perfect opportunity to rule on that question yet chose to ignore it. In Hepps and Milkovich the Court specifically stated it was not addressing that issue. The message some scholars and lower courts have taken away, however, is that private defamatory speech is--or should be- 67 Id. Because he saw the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the press as directly tied to the need for citizens to have access to all relevant information and ideas so that they could effectively self-govern, 76 Meiklejohn famously concluded that the First Amendment "established an absolute, unqualified prohibition of the abridgement of the freedom of speech."" Nevertheless, Meiklejohn extended this protection only to speech related to selfgovernment. 8 Meiklejohn wrote that the purpose of protecting public speech was to "give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal." 79 He reasoned that the First Amendment did not protect an individual's right "to speak;"" 0 rather, it is concerned "with a public power, a governmental responsibility," and protects only the "commu-
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See generally MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 1-27.
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Id. at 17. We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. U.S. CONST. pmbl; see MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 15 ("In those words it is agreed, and with every passing moment it is reagreed, that the people of the United States shall be self-governed."). Meiklejohn claimed that all other provisions of the document should find their "legitimate scope and meaning only as they conform to the one basic purpose that the citizens of this nation shall make and shall obey their own laws." Id. 80 Meiklejohn, Absolute, supra note 79, at 255. 83 See id. at 21 (contending that a literal, absolute reading of the First Amendment leads to absurd results). 84 See id. at 22 (noting that the "framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with the subject"). 85 See id. at 23. 87 Free expression acts as a safety-valve, allowing critics to "discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies," rather than seeking change through radical acts. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring); Bork, supra note 82, at 25-26 (terming this benefit of free speech the "safety valve"); see generally Emerson, supra note 86, at 879-81.
88 Bork, supra note 82, at 26. 89 Id. at 26. Bork was critical of Meiklejohn's later writings that argued for First Amendment protection for many different kinds of expression, such as novels, dramas, paintings and poems, because literary works informed a citizen's ability to vote. Compare Bork, supra note 82, at 26-27 (calling for the "principled judge" to refuse the tempting invitation to extend First Amendment protection to speech beyond that which is "explicitly political"), with Meiklejohn, Absolute, supra note 79, at 263 ("I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems."). principle; it merely responds to the view that speech about public figures is an effective equivalent of political speech." ' 93 BeVier, however, argued that a majority of the Court should have embraced Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom, which extended constitutional protection to "all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern." ' 94 BeVier was highly critical of the Gertz Court's holding that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." 95 More recently, Professor James Weinstein contended that a political speech approach best explained the Court's freedom of expression doctrine and was the most "normatively attractive,"" noting that as recently as 2011, in Snyder v. Phelps,"' the distinction between political and non-political speech "proved crucial."'"' Weinstein would extend protection to speech that does not involve "a speaker's right of democratic participation" if regulation of such speech "unduly interferes with the audience's interest in receiving information needed to develop informed views on public policy matters.' '°2 He also supported a right of access to information if it contributed to a citizen's right to engage in self-government.' 03 Weinstein, however, was unwilling to extend protection to other types of speech that had no connection to the political process."° Although, as noted above, a majority of the Supreme Court has never declared private defamatory speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, 5 Weinstein categorically declared, "[I]f the speech addresses a purely private concern, then no First Amendment limitations restrain the normal operation of defamation law. 110 Id. at 479. Post argued that because "autonomy" applies to actions as well as speech, there "are many situations in which the autonomy of a speaker conflicts with the autonomy of an audience," and "there are many situations in which the autonomy of a speaker and the harm done by the speech remain constant," and yet First Amendment protections differ. Consequently, individual self-fulfillment could not explain free speech jurisprudence. Id. at
479-80.
"'1 Id. at 478-79. According to Post, because the First Amendment "recognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea," the First Amendment was unsuited to the discovery of truth or the creation of new knowledge. Id. at 478. Post wrote, "The creation of knowledge .. . depends upon practices that continually separate the true from the false, the better from the worse." Id. at 478-79. 112 Id. at 481. "3 Id. at 482. Post explained: Democracy involves far more than a method of decision making; at root democracy refers to the value of authorship. Democracy refers to a certain relationship between persons and their government. Democracy is achieved when those who are subject to law believe that they are also potential authors of law. Elections and other mechanisms that we ordinarily associate with democratic decision making are simply institutions designed to maximize the likelihood that this relationship obtains. claims."' Post contended the First Amendment should protect "public discourse"-or speech that contributes to the formation of public opinion-rather than "political speech."" ' 119 Weinstein placed more emphasis on the content of the speech, focusing on the classic definition of "matters of public concern." Post wrote that identical content might or might not be constitutionally protected given the context in which the speech occurred. James Weinstein, supra note 99, at 493 n.9 ("One difference is that, in determining whether an individual instance of speech is part of public discourse, I place somewhat greater emphasis on the content of the speech (that is, whether or not it is on a matter of public concern), while Post focuses more on its context (that is, whether or not the expression occurs in a setting essential to democratic self-governance."). In a previous article focusing on the impact of Dun & Bradstreet,' 27 we found a number of courts, including eight U.S. courts of appeals, fourteen U.S. district courts, and appellate courts in twenty-two states, had addressed how the First Amendment applies to private-private defamation cases.' 2 ' Based on that analysis, we concluded courts have "run the gamut from assertions that Dun & Bradstreet swept away all First Amendment requirements in privateprivate suits to unequivocal declarations that the case affected nothing but the fault requirement for presumed and punitive damages.' 2 9 Even after the First Circuit's 2009 refusal to rule that truth is an absolute First Amendment defense in private-private defamation cases, 3 ' few scholars examined the deconstitutionalization of private speech.
3 ' This study updates this important development in First Amendment law, which has generated considerable normative debate but little recent empirical analysis. When the Massachusetts federal district court initially dismissed Noonan's libel claim, it did so because it found the statements in the email to be true." 4 All three times the First Circuit reviewed the case, it never disputed that the email was true: Noonan was fired for violating the company's travel and expense policy. 4 On rehearing, however, the First Circuit focused on a 1902 Massachusetts statute that provides truth is a defense to libel "unless actual malice is proved."' ' The First Circuit said the term "actual malice" in the statute could not possibly refer to constitutional actual malice because the statute was enacted sixty-two years before the U.S. Supreme Court defined actual malice as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.' 43 Additionally, applying a knowing or reckless falsification standard to true statements, the court reasoned, made no sense'" The federal appellate court then turned to a 1903 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion' 45 to determine that under state law a true statement published with "'ill will"' or "'malevolent intent"' was actionable in private figure-private issue libel cases." A jury, the First Circuit said, could find "ill will" because 1) "in Baitler's twelve years with the company, he had never previously referred to a fired employee by name in an e-mail or other mass communication;" 47 2) Baitler did not send around an email about the employee who had been fired for embezzlement, which could lead a jury to conclude he had "singled out Noonan to detract attention away from the [earlier] scandal" because Baitler had been the supervisor of the embezzling employee;' 48 and 3) sending the email to about 1500 employees, some of whom might not even travel for their jobs, could be deemed excessive publication."' Remarkably, the First Circuit never addressed the constitutionality of the 1902 Massachusetts statute in its opinion, apparently because Staples's attorneys never raised the issue. 5 Indeed, in its entire opinion, the court cited only two U.S. Supreme Court libel cases, one of which was to identify the postpetition as a petition for panel rehearing and a request to certify to the Massachusetts Su- The court, however, failed to take the next step of either discussing or supporting the proposition that, under Hepps, true statements of private concern are actionable. When Staples petitioned the court for rehearing en banc, the company sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute that allowed liability for true but maliciously published defamatory statements.' 54 Although the First Circuit said it would not consider the constitutional challenge because Staples had not raised the issue in its initial brief, the court addressed the issue briefly in the rehearing.' 55 The constitutional issue, the court said, was not "so clear that the panel should have acted sua sponte to strike down a state statute, without the required notice to the state attorney general."' 56 The court continued, "Staples still [did] not cite a case for the proposition that the First Amendment does not permit liability for true statements concerning matters of private concern."' 57 However, Staples did cite a 1975 ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, but the panel found the case "did not hold that truth is an absolute defense in private concern cases, but rather that a private figure may recover for a negligently made defamatory falsehood in a case of public concern."' 5 8
IV. DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE SPEECH IN THE LOWER COURTS
The First Circuit then went on to quote Hepps--" [T] he Supreme Court has stated that as to matters of private concern, the First Amendment does 'not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the commonlaw landscape'"'-and the Dun & Bradstreet statement on "'the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern."" 59 ruled on the truth-with-malice statute in 1998, it held the law invalid only as applied to truthful defamatory statements concerning "matters of public concern. ' " ' Staples's petition for rehearing was denied, and the case remanded for trial. In October 2009, a Boston jury found in favor of Staples, 6 ' but, of course, that jury verdict did nothing to disturb the First Circuit's decision to permit potential liability for true, malicious, defamatory statements.
A little more than a year before the First Circuit's surprising ruling in Noonan, a Massachusetts state trial court had ruled that even in a privatefigure-private-issue defamation case, the defendant bore the burden of proving the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement.' 62 McNamara v. Costello began with a letter sent by Patrick Costello, special counsel for the treasurer/tax collector of the Town of Millville, Massachusetts, to Susan McNamara's attorney and to the City of Millville Tax Collector and Treasurer.' 63 McNamara, the town clerk and assistant assessor for Millville, contended the letter accused her of criminal conduct in the acquisition of two parcels of land." 6 The parties disagreed over whether the plaintiff was a public figure and whether the letter addressed a matter of public concern.' 65 Because the court was ruling on the defendant's summary judgment motion, it construed all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and, consequently, treated "McNamara as a private figure and the statement a matter of private concern for purposes of deciding the motion for summary judgment."' ' 66 Citing the same Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion the First Circuit later used to support the proposition that truth was not necessarily an absolute defense in a private issue libel case in Massachusetts, the trial court declared, "Even as a private figure, McNamara would still bear the burden, at trial, of proving that Costello's statement was a defamatory falsehood.' 67 
Which court was correct in its interpretation of the Massachusetts high court's ruling in Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.?
6 That is a difficult question to answer, primarily because the timing of Stone was one year after the Supreme Court repudiated focus on the subject matter of the defamatory report in Gertz, " ' 69 and nine years before the Court resurrected subject matter consideration in Hepps." 7° In fact, it was the Supreme Court's retreat from subject matter consideration in Gertz that brought the Stone case back to the Massachusetts high court for a rehearing. When the supreme judicial court first heard Stone, in May 1974, one month before Gertz was decided, it based its ruling on Rosenbloom 7 ' and held that plaintiff's status was immaterial given that the subject of the report, "a public prosecution," was "one of public interest under the Metromedia case."' 7 Acknowledging that Gertz prompted its decision to rehear the case,' 73 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court first laid out the constitutional rules of libel post-Gertz. 7 " Because the trial court had not resolved whether Stone, who held a position in local government, was a public official or a private figure, the court listed the fault requirements for both before remanding the case for retrial. 75 Here is where the disputed quotation occurred: "Accordingly, we hold that private persons, as distinguished from public officials and public figures, may recover compensation on proof of negligent publication of a defamatory falsehood."' 76 This is the quote Staples argued proved that truth is an absolute defense in defamation cases and that the McNamara court held required falsity in private-private cases,' 77 but it's also the quote the First Circuit said proved no more than that falsity was required in cases involving matters of public concern. 7 Because the First Circuit refused to certify to the state supreme court the question of the interpretation of the Massachusetts truth-with-malice statute,'
79 it is impossible to know how today's state high court justices would interpret the words of their predecessors.
Adding to the concern generated by the First Circuit's ruling in Noonan is the fact that at least eighteen other states have constitutional or statutory provisions that permit civil liability and/or criminal punishment for truthful defamatory statements. 1 8° A few, such as the Massachusetts law, are written in the 169 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974 This study did not discover any cases other than Noonan in which courts held that libel defendants could be liable for publishing the truth. However, revised jury instructions for use in civil cases in Florida, approved by the state supreme court in March 2010, clearly open the door for more such cases. 3 The jury instructions recognize three categories of defamation cases: (1) those in which the plaintiff is a public person and the defendant is "a member of the press or broadcast media publishing on a matter of public concern;" (2) those in which the plaintiff is a private person and the defendant is "a member of the press or broadcast media publishing on a matter of public concern;" and (3) "all other claims," which includes private figure plaintiffs, nonmedia defendants, and matters of private concern." In the last category of defamation cases-private-plaintiff-private-issue and nonmedia defendants-the instructions indicated that "Florida's truth and good motives defense" applies.'
85 Although the portion of the jury instructions deal- First Amendment context it can ever be actionable, whatever the motive, to speak the truth. Pending a Florida decision explaining its meaning and effect, the committee assumes that "the truth and good motives" provision tolerates at least as wide a range of motives for speaking the truth as the common law tolerates for speaking untruthfully in a privileged situation.
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None of the post-1985 Florida cases identified for this study discussed the truth/falsity issue.' Thus, it is unknown what the Florida courts would do if faced with a case such as Noonan. Indeed, truth/falsity did not generate much discussion at all in the opinions reviewed, perhaps because it was seldom an issue in dispute. In the few cases in which courts did discuss truth/falsity, most simply followed the Hepps rule. In doing so, many courts cited only state precedents and not Hepps, noting that defendants in private-private cases could raise truth as a defense. 9 ' In a few cases, courts simply declared that fal-186 Id. at 730 (defining a substantially true statement as one whose "substance or gist conveys essentially the same meaning that the truth would have conveyed," but failing to define "good motives"). ), was decided-were searched using the term "libel or defamation or slander and 'private figure' or 'private person' or 'private individual."' A secondary search of the cases identified using the primary search term was then conducted using the term "'matter of private concern' or 'not matter of public concern' or 'private interest' or 'not public interest' or 'private issue' or 'not public issue' or 'matters not of public concern' or 'does not involve matters of public concern' or ,a matter not of public concern' or 'not a matter of public concern' or 'matters of private concern' or 'not matters of public concern."' The cases identified by the secondary search were then manually searched to identify opinions addressing the standards to be applied in defamation cases involving private individuals and matters of private concern. This search did not find any Florida defamation cases dealing with the issue. 94 Snead involved a press release regarding a lawsuit for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of a confidential relationship between a Texas company and two British companies.' 95 Snead, chairman of Georgetown Railroad Company, issued a press release accusing the two British companies of "international theft," "industrial espionage" and "international piracy."' 96 The court first determined that Redlands and its co-defendant, Standard Railway Wagon, were not public figures due to their relative anonymity in America.' 97 Such anonymity was a result of minimal past publicity, along with the fact that mining companies and railroad construction companies were not typically "household names."' 98 Next, the court noted that, although international competition and industrial espionage "may be" matters of public concem, Snead's "speech does not concern an ongoing public debate about international competition and industrial espionage" and "was not aimed at enlightening the public."' ' 9 Therefore, it was speech of private concern "had a severe cocaine problem."" 2 9 In another unreported opinion, the Northem Mariana Islands Supreme Court suggested in a footnote that the Supreme Court's ruling in Dun & Bradstreet removed the fault requirements in privateprivate cases, "reviving the common law rule when private plaintiffs allege defamation on issues of private concern." 2 ' However, it is unclear from the context whether the court was discussing all fault requirements or only those for presumed and punitive damages. 21 ' In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina decision Sleem v. Yale University, a 1975 Yale alumnus sued the university for publishing a false "personal statement" about him in a class directory. 2 The statement, which Sleem had not submitted, read: "I have come to terms with my homosexuality and the reality of AIDS in my life. I am at peace." 2 ' 3 The court began its discussion, cautiously stating that "the implication of Dun & Bradstreet" is that the plaintiff in a private-figure-private-issue libel case is "no longer constitutionally required to prove fault." ' 214 Nonetheless, the court quickly abandoned caution and by the end of the paragraph asserted that "Dun & Bradstreet allows the states to choose whether to allow presumed damages and impose liability without fault in cases involving private person plaintiffs and non-public issues."
5
In addition to federal courts, the Arizona, Kentucky, and Colorado supreme courts have all declared that private-private defamation cases are exempt from constitutional requirements." 6 In 1986, just three months after the Supreme Court decided Hepps, the Arizona Supreme Court cited Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps in support of its categorical conclusion that "when a plaintiff is a private figure and the speech is of private concern, the states are free to retain common law principles."" 2 7 Interestingly, as in much of the dangerous discussion of private-private standards, the statement was in dicta because the plaintiff was a public figure and the subject of the news story was a matter of public concern. D.N.C. 1993) . 213 Id. Yale was never able to determine who submitted the questionnaire. Id. 214 Id. at 61. 215 Id. at 61-62.
that constitutional protection is not triggered in suits that involve private statements made by private parties.
2 9 In a case similar to Noonan, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that statements related to the termination of two women for "unauthorized removal of company property" and "violation of company policy" for eating "claims candy"-candy from open or torn bags removed from the store's shelves that had been taken to the store's "claims area"--was a private matter. 22° Unlike its Arizona counterpart, however, the Kentucky court failed to support its bold assertion with any citations, quotations, or discussion. 22 ' In People v. Ryan, 222 a criminal libel case, the Colorado Supreme Court referred to private-private defamation as "constitutionally unprotected conduct." ' 223 In Ryan, which involved a man who mailed copies of a fictitious "Wanted" poster to several businesses, bars, and a local trailer park in Fort Collins, Colorado, 224 the court declared that, "[I]n a purely private context, a less restrictive culpability standard may be used to meet the state's legitimate interest in controlling constitutionally unprotected conduct injurious to its citizens." 5 According to the court, the criminal libel statute in question-which 219 Stringer, 151 S.W.3d at 793. 220 Id. at 786, 793. The deconstitutionalization of private speech is especially troublesome in criminal libel cases in light of Professor Pritchard's conclusion that criminal libel is especially likely to be used when expression harms the reputations of private figures in cases outside the scope of public issues. Therefore, if the deconstitutionalization of private speech were to continue, defendants may have no constitutional protections from criminal charges that result from speech.
223 Ryan, 806 P.2d at 939 (emphasis added). The court left it unclear why it was referring to the expression in question as "conduct," a distinction that could conceivably remove the speech from First Amendment protection regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the subject matter of the allegedly defamatory statement. 224 The poster stated that the woman was wanted for "'fraud, conspiricy [sic] to commit fraud, various flimflam schemes, spouse abuse, child abuse-neglect, sex abuse, abuse of the elderly, prostitution, assault, larceny, theft of services, wage chiseling, [and] breach of contract."' According to the court, the poster also stated the woman "'has harbored various forms of VD,' and is at 'high risk for AIDS.' In addition, the poster set forth the victim's age, hair color, weight, height, eye color, birth date, and residence, and offered a $3,000 reward for 'information leading to the criminal or civil prosecution' of the victim." Id. at 936. 225 Id. at 939.
did not contain an actual malice standard-was only invalid as applied to constitutionally protected statements "about public officials or public figures on matters of public concern." 226 The statute, however, could be applied when a private individual has harmed the reputation of another private individual. 227 In addition to those courts that have expressly declared that the privateplaintiff-private-issue defamation is unprotected by the First Amendment, many others have foregone constitutional analysis and relied on state law. These courts have failed to explicitly mention a Supreme Court decision that deals with private-private speech, 228 or they have expressed uncertainty about whether constitutional limits apply.
2 29 A 2010 Louisiana Court of Appeal decision provides a recent example of a court relying solely on state precedent. 230 In Jalou II, Inc. v. Liner, the court relied on the "negligence standard of liability in defamation actions by private individuals involving matters of private concern" that was stated in the Louisiana Supreme Court case Costello v. Hardy. 231 Interestingly, the 2004 Louisiana Supreme Court case that was cited by the court of appeals was discussing the definition of "malice" applicable in cases in which the words were not defamatory per se. 232 In such cases, the state supreme court stated that the plaintiff must prove "in addition to defamatory meaning and publication, the elements of falsity, malice (or fault) and injury. 233 The court then defined malice as "a lack of reasonable belief in the truth of the statement giving rise to the defamation" and noted that it more closely resembled negligence "with respect to the truth" than spite or improper motive. Staples, 23 it seems likely that its earlier uncertainty paved the way for its willingness to permit liability for the publication of the truth.
C. Opinion in Private-Person-Private-Issue Defamation Cases
At least one federal court and one state appellate court have also ruled that private-private speech does not qualify as constitutionally protected opinion.
39
In Roffman v. Trump, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that only state law determines the protection available for statements of opinion in a private-private case. 24 Roffman began with an article in The Wall Street Journal in which casino analyst Marvin Roffman predicted that Donald Trump's Taj Mahal in Atlantic City "won't make it. The market just isn't there. ' 243 the court asserted that "the actionability of statements of opinion in the private plaintiff/private issue context must be determined by reference to state law." ' 246 In a detailed discussion of Supreme Court cases, Chief Judge Louis C. 235 See Noonan v. Staples, 561 F.3d 4 (1 st Cir. 2009). 236 Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart, 127 F.3d 122, 128 n.4 (lst Cir. 1997). 237 Andresen v. Diorio, 349 F.3d 8, 17 n.4 (1st Cir. 2003) . 238 See Noonan, 561 F.3d at 7. 239 See Roffman v. Trump, 754 F. Supp 411,415-16 (E.D. Pa. 1990 ). 240 Id. at415. 241 Id. at413. 242 Id. 243 Id. at413-14. 244 Id. at413-14. 245 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co, 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
Bechtle cited Dun & Bradstreet for the proposition that while the Court had constitutionalized libel law in cases involving public figures or issues of public concerns, it had "created few restrictions" on state defamation law in cases involving private plaintiffs and private concerns. 247 Two years later, the district court cited Roffman to again conclude that only state law applied to privateprivate defamation cases. 24 In a good example of the potential power of minority opinions, a Minnesota Court of Appeals dissenter's opinion that "in the absence of... a public context, a defamation action is not constitutionally significant, but rather is governed by state common law" became the holding of the court within weeks. 249 In Lund v. Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co., Judge Gary Crippen disagreed with his two colleagues who ruled that a memo placed on a workplace bulletin board was constitutionally protected opinion. 250 In his dissent, Judge Crippen relied on Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps, while citing Roffman v. Trump, to support the following assertion: "The internal business communication at issue in this appeal is of purely private concern. The plaintiff is a private figure. Thus, we should determine the dispute according to state common law principles rather than constitutional law."" Just six weeks later, in Weissman v. Sri Lanka Curry House, a case involving a former employer who told a prospective employer that plaintiff was "unreliable," "dishonest," and had "walked out." ' 252 Judge Crippen and two different colleagues boldly declared that "the Supreme Court has not extended constitutional protections for public speech to speech of purely private concern." '
253
After dismissing the applicability of First Amendment protection for opinion, the court declared that Minnesota common law fails to distinguish between fact and opinion, and that " [a] Other courts have stated that it is questionable whether First Amendment protection for opinion applies to private-private cases without directly deciding the question, largely because they focused on state laws that would grant similar protections for opinion. For example, in 2011, in an unreported slander case, the New York Supreme Court expressed its uncertainty over whether constitutional protection for opinion/rhetorical hyperbole applied to privateprivate nonmedia speech.
2 8 The court stated, As far as this Court is aware, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor our Court of Appeals has expressly resolved whether some or all of the identified constitutional limits apply to an action, like this one, by a private person against a "nonmedia" defendant that is not based upon a statement on a matter of public concern.
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The court further suggested the New York Constitution, not the United States Constitution, protects this type of speech. 26 Similarly, in a 2008 case involving a public figure and a matter of public concern, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated in dicta that it was "unsettled" whether a constitutional privilege for opinion extended to statements made by a "private party about another on a matter of purely private concern." After a discussion of Supreme Court libel precedents from New York Times through Hepps, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals also expressed uncertainty, asserting that "many of the protections afforded defendants in regard to speech concerning matters of public concern and public figures or public officials may not be applicable unless afforded by Maryland law." 262 The court then undertook an extensive comparison of constitutional protection for opinion and the common law fair comment defense, concluding the two were essentially the same. 263 The court ultimately declared that the statement in question was not defamatory because it was pure opinion, as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In late 2011, the question of whether nonmedia libel defendants enjoy constitutional protection drew renewed attention-especially in the online worldafter the United States -District Court for the District of Oregon held that a blogger did not qualify as a media defendant and, therefore, was not entitled to the protections of Gertz,. 65 Judge Marco Hernandez's ruling led to a jury verdict of $2.5 million against blogger Crystal Cox, who a jury found libeled Obsidian Finance Group and its co-founder, Kevin Padrick, in one of her posts.
66
Cox, representing herself, sought both constitutional and statutory protections available to media and journalists, all of which Hemandez denied, declaring that "defendant is not media. '2 67 In this diversity action, the federal court applied Oregon law, and, in 1977, the Oregon Supreme Court had become the second state high court 28 to rule that the constitutional protections enunciated in Gertz did not apply to nonmedia defendants. Inc. v. Markley, an employee of a dealership wrote a false letter of complaint about a competing motorcycle dealership. 7 The court described the dispute as one lacking a public official or public figure plaintiff, a public issue, and a media defendant. 27 ' Further, the court concluded that there was no interest in "democratic dialogue. 272 The state high court relied on Gertz's references to publishers, broadcasters, and media, as well as a 1975 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., Amendment was inapplicable. 74 Consequently, the court upheld a jury verdict of $500 in general damages and $25,000 in punitive damages without proof of fault or actual injury. 275 The Wisconsin case cited by the Oregon Supreme Court to support its ruling resulted from statements made by a former employer about an accountant to prospective employers." 6 Ruling less than a year after the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gertz, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated, "Neither [New York] Times' nor Gertz' [sic] protections apply to the case before us." ' . 7 . As the Oregon court did two years later, the Wisconsin high court based its decision on the fact that "[i]n the case before us there is no matter of general or public interest; there is no public official or public figure; there is no involvement of the media, either broadcast or print." ' 278 The key constitutional question in Calero was whether proof of actual malice, as opposed to common-law malice, was required to sustain an award of punitive damages in matters of private concern.
79 In Denny v. Mertz, however, a Wisconsin court relied on the Calero decision to strip a nonmedia libel defendant of all constitutional protections even though the case appeared to involve a matter of public interest. 8° This case resulted from an effort by dissident stockholders, including William Denny, a former Koehring Corp. employee, to change the management of Koehring, of which Orville Mertz was chairman and CEO. 28 " ' The shareholder dispute was widely reported in Milwau- Week magazine, published after Mertz resigned as chairman and CEO, ultimately resulted in the libel suit. 283 The magazine article erroneously stated Mertz fired Denny, who, in fact, had quit in order to enter private law practice. 284 Denny sued both Mertz and Business Week. 2 " 5 After finding that Denny was not a public figure, the court held that "a negligence standard [applies] 295 The court went on to assert:
None of the cases we could find suggests that Wisconsin imposes a lesser burden on a public figure suing a psychologist or prosecutor than on one suing a reporter. Actually, we could not find cases either way on this subject; all of Wisconsin's "public figure" cases were against media defendants.
296
However, after emphasizing it was just addressing Wisconsin law, the Seventh Circuit cited reasons not to treat media and nonmedia defendants differently, which clearly apply nationwide:
Just as the public has a strong interest in providing reporters with a qualified privilege to report on current events without fear of liability for accidental misstatements, so the public has a strong interest in protecting scholars and prosecutors .... [T] Because Dun & Bradstreet involved both a private figure plaintiff and a matter not of public concern, the plurality's references to speech of "reduced constitutional value" 3 4 and "less First Amendment concern" 3 " 5 were part of the ratio decidendi.
3 6 Hepps, however, involved a matter of public concern. Consequently, Justice O'Connor's declaration that the First Amendment has "not necessarily" changed "some of the features of the common-law landscape" as it applies to private-private defamation was merely dicta."' Of course, it is not uncommon for lower courts to use Supreme Court dicta as the basis for their decisions. Indeed, a key purpose of the Court's opinion in Milkovich 3 1 8 seemed to be to put a halt to misuse of a dictum from Gertz: "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea." 3 9 In Milkovich, the Court stated, "[W]e do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion."'32
It is time now for the Supreme Court to do the same thing regarding the misuse of its Hepps dictum and Dun & Bradstreet language regarding "reduced" and "less" constitutional protection for private speech. "We do not think these passages were intended to create a wholesale exemption from the First Amendment for anything that might be labeled 'private speech"' has become a much-needed pronouncement by the Court.
32
There are compelling normative and practical reasons for continuing to recognize First Amendment limitations on defamation law as it applies to private speech. First, Meiklejohn, Bork, and other theorists notwithstanding, the First Amendment does not say, "Congress shall make no law abridging political [or public] speech." The contextual argument that coupling speech and press protection with the right to assemble and petition government indicates the framers' vision of an amendment designed to protect only the discussion of matters of public concern in order to promote self-governance begs the question of why, then, those same framers would couple such purely public interest-based rights with protection for what is surely one of the most personal and individualistic decisions a person makes-whether and how to worship a deity. 322 Despite BeVier's, Weinstein's, and other theorists' critiques, values other than self-governance have a long and important history in the development of First Amendment theory and doctrine. Indeed, it is hard to imagine justifying First Amendment protection for sexually explicit and obscene speech, 323 nude dancing,"' violent video games,"' and commercial advertising 326 without recognition of freedom of expression's role in promoting individual selffulfillment and a robust marketplace of political, social, and commercial ideas. While it is possible to construct a definition of political speech that protects a broad range of expression, as Post did in his "public discourse" concept 2 and Meiklejohn did in his later writings, 32 it is much easier to simply admit that the Court has indeed extended protection to speech that has little to do with selfgovernance, politics, or public debate. The Court has embraced many First Amendment values over the years that have little to do with political speech or self-government. Normatively, it is difficult to imagine a principled way of explaining why a Staples vice president's true statement to employees that a co-worker was fired for violating the company's travel and expense policy is not protected by the First Amendment 329 Furthermore, lower courts are removing protection from private speech at a time when, as the Court noted, new communication technologies are giving the average citizen "a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox." ' 336 Removing constitutional protection for private defamatory speech threatens vast amounts of information and opinion in an Internet age. Millions of people each day check social networking sites, consumer review and evaluation sites, blogs, and tweets for both information and entertainment. 337 Given courts' rulings on what constitutes speech regarding non-public issues, 33 it is highly likely that much of the information posted on such websites would fall into the category of private-private speech.
Simply because the speech is about a private figure and involves what a court later decides is not of public concern, does not mean that the speech was not of importance to the speaker or the audience. Consider, for example, the speech at issue in Roffman v. Trump, where, as noted above, Donald Trump's attacks on Roffman's professional abilities and character were published in major national and regional newspapers and magazines. 339 Clearly, Roffman's competence as an analyst was of significant importance to the speaker and presumably to the readers of respected business and general publications who received his message. Roffman illustrates another major issue with denying constitutional protection to speech that a court deems is not of public interest. The concept "pubic interest" or "public concern" is undefined and, perhaps, indefinable. Reporters and editors at Fortune, the New York Post, and the other publications believed there to be sufficient public interest in the story to justify publishing Trump's remarks. Nonetheless, the court decided to second-guess those news judgments, holding that "the statements that form the basis of Roffman's defamation action relate to Roffman's competence and integrity ... [which] are of no concern to the general public." 4 Recall Justice Powell's statement in Gertz regarding the "difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not." ' ' Justice Powell continued, "We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges." ' 342 In the decades following Gertz, numerous scholars have documented the difficulty of that task. "' As Professor Nate Stem concluded in 2000:
The struggle by lower courts to interpret the Court's terse pronouncements on the distinction between public and private concerns has not crystallized into a useful methodology. Rather, courts have generally proceeded by way of ad hoc analyses or ipse dixit conclusions. The inability of courts to translate this doctrine into a lucid framework ... does not represent a failure ofjudicial imagination. Instead ... the enterprise was destined to founder because of the inherent indeterminacy of the distinction between public and private concerns in defamatory expression. 344 Surely, if this was true in 2000, before the advent of Facebook, 3 4 ' Twitter, defamation law could be content-neutral, 349 he also expressed a willingness to focus on the content of speech when denying protection to private-concemprivate-plaintiff defamatory speech.
35°I
f Post were interested in protecting the public sphere, it would seem that expression available in newspapers and on the Internet should be protected regardless of its content or context. Have not newspapers long been considered institutions of the public sphere? Under this content-neutral analysis, as Professor C. Edwin Baker concludes, "Should not all newspaper content be as protected as it is when describing public officials' performance of public duties?"
35 ' It would also seem that Post should be willing to protect much of what is expressed on the Internet, given the "utopian rhetoric" 2 about the ability of new media technologies to further democratize post-industrial society and create a new Habermasian public sphere. Further supportive of this notion is the ongoing efforts to keep the Internet free from burdensome overregulation by public and private entities in order to maintain its democratic nature.
3 While efforts to keep the Internet "free" structurally through net neutrality are extremely important, one wonders whether the Internet can deliver on its promise to democratize the public sphere if much of the expression on blogs, Facebook, and Twitter could be deemed private speech unprotected by the First Amendment.
Other problems arise when courts consider audience size in determining whether speech is on a matter of public or private concern. Although the Dun & Bradstreet plurality opinion stated that it was "'content, form, and context' that determine whether speech involves a public matter does this say of the email in question in Noonan v. Staples that was sent to approximately 1500 Staples employees? 3 " Surely that is a fairly large "intended audience." And what of expression that goes viral? In the age of the Internet, even the most private video, picture, or Facebook post can quickly go viral and have an audience of thousands, if not millions. Courts are already having difficulty applying the public concern test without having to ascertain whether an Internet speaker "intended" her message to reach a large audience."' Finally, Denny v. Mertz illustrates the illogic of considering the media or nonmedia nature of a speaker in determining the availability of constitutional protection for speech. 36 As noted above, the case began when William A.
Denny, a dissident stockholder and former employee of Koehring Co., a publicly held corporation, sought to oust CEO Orville R. Mertz. 373 However, deeming one defendant to be at fault and the other not is a far cry from stating that one defendant is not entitled to any constitutional protection while the other is shielded from liability by the First Amendment.
